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NOTES
DIRKS v. SEC's FOOTNOTE FOURTEEN: HORIZONTAL
AND VERTICAL REACH
In Dirks v. SEC,' the Supreme Court significantly narrowed the
scope of tippee liability under the federal securities laws.2 The Court
held that a tippee3 comes within the "disclose-or-abstain" 4 prohibition
of rule lOb-5 5 only when the tipper breaches a fiduciary duty6 to the
1. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
2. See Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REv. SEC. REG. (S & P) 841, 844
(1983). The victor in the case, Raymond Dirks, believes the decision will "help securities analysts
perform their job without fear of getting into trouble." H. BAKER, R. BARRON & H. HAVELES, JR.,
REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS 1 2. 14[2], at S2-77 (Supp. 1983).
See also infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
3. A "tipper" is a person who discloses material inside information. A "tippee" is the recipi-
ent of such information. E.g., Grumet v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 336, 340
(D.N.J. 1983); 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5 § 164 (1980).
4. The Second Circuit originated the "disclose-or-abstain" rule in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The
defendants argued that legitimate corporate objectives prohibited them from publicly disclosing
certain information prior to trading. The court replied that "anyone in possession of material
inside information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclos-
ing it in order to protect a corporate confidence.. . must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such information remains undisclosed." Id. See infra
notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
5. Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976). The statute is a general provision prohibiting fraudulent practices. Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202-06 (1976). See also Miller v. Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc.,
540 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir. 1976) (cause-of-action under section 10(b) requires showing of "fraud
or deceit").
Rule lOb-5 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly, or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
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issuer's shareholders.7  The Court further stated that an insider-tipper
breaches this fiduciary duty only when he selectively discloses inside
information for an improper purpose.' The tippee becomes seconda-
rily liable only if he knew or should have known that the insider
breached his fiduciary duty to the company's shareholders.9
The Court's decision closely follows the framework of analysis set
forth in Chiarella v. United States, ° in which the Court described the
tippee as a "participant after the fact" in the tipper's breach of duty."'
In footnote fourteen of its Dirks opinion,' the Court recognized that
certain recipients of confidential corporate information might directly
incur liability as "tippers,"' 3 rather than as "tippees,"' 4 pursuant to
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as.a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
6. A fiduciary must preserve the confidentiality of information obtained from the benefici-
ary. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 200 (1937). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AOENCY
§ 395 (1958) (agent under same duty to principal). Two corollaries follow from this rule. First,
the fiduciary cannot use confidential information for his personal advantage. RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION, supra, at § 200 comment a. Second, the fiduciary must not "sell" confidential infor-
mation to a third person. Id. comment b. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment
b (1959) (fiduciary cannot profit at beneficiary's expense). These principles form the basis of the
Court's assertion in Dirks that a tipper does not violate rule lob-5 unless he derives some personal
advantage from the disclosure. See infra text accompanying notes 67-68.
7. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261-62 (1983).
8. Id at 3265. The Court's determination of the tippers purpose rests on objective criteria.
The most important consideration is whether the insider personally benefits from the disclosure.
Id at 3266.
9. Id at 3264.
10. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11. Id at 230 n.12. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
12. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14. Footnote fourteen states in pertinent part:
Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legiti-
mately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation,
these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The basis for recognizing
this fiduciary duty is not simply that such persons acquired nonpublic corporate infor-
mation, but rather that they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the
conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes.. . . When such a person breaches his fiduciary relationship, he
may be treated more properly as a tipper than a tippee .... For such a duty to be
imposed, however, the corporation must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed non-
public information confidential, and the relationship at least must imply such a duty.
13. Id
14. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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Chiarellds "after the fact" theory.15 These "tippers" acquire a duty to
abstain from trading' 6 even though they receive nonpublic information
for a legitimate purpose.'7
The SEC contends that footnote fourteen undercuts the Chiarella-
Dirks emphasis on fiduciary duty.'8 The Commission maintains that
footnote fourteen presents a powerful mechanism for placing a duty to
disclose on tippers and tippees.19
The SEC overstates the scope of footnote fourteen. Properly consid-
ered the footnote reaches only those persons with a preexisting contrac-
tual or ethical obligation to protect the confidentiality of inside
information. This Note proposes that traditional concepts of agency
law and fiduciary duty compel a limited reading of footnote fourteen
that is consistent with the Supreme Court's development of lOb-5 doc-
trine in Chiarella and Dirks. Part One of this Note traces the historical
origins of footnote fourteen.'0 Part Two considers the classes of per-
sons characterized as "constructive insiders" that come within footnote
fourteen's "horizontal scope."'" Part Three examines the "vertical
scope" of footnote fourteen, using the law firm as a model to determine
whether courts should treat employees of "constructive insiders" as
"tippers."2 " This Note concludes that footnote fourteen extends liabil-
ity only to the extent necessary to prevent unreasonable results when an
outsider2 3 exploits confidential information.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
16. See supra note 4.
17. 103 S. Ct. at 3261 n.14.
18. See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP (BNA), No. 38, 1820 (Sept. 30, 1983) ("valuable new
tool"); Legal Times, Nov. 7, 1983, at 64, col. 4, n.51 ("salvation" for the SEC); id at 28, col. 1
("potent new theory"). The Commission has not articulated the boundaries of footnote fourteen.
Telephone interview with Phillip Parker, Associate Director, SEC Enforcement Division (Feb. 8,
1984).
20. See infra notes 24-76 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 77-142 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 143-85 and accompanying text.
23. The term "outsider" refers to persons other than directors, officers, and controlling share-
holders of the issuer. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934) (persons covered by
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976)).
Number 3]
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I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF FOOTNOTE FOURTEEN
A. The Relational Theory
In Cady, Roberts & Co.24 a partner of a brokerage firm received in-
formation of a dividend reduction from a business associate 25 who was
a director of the issuer.26 The broker then sold shares of the affected
company's stock for his customers and wife before the information be-
came public. 27 When the SEC instituted a rule 1Ob-5 action against the
broker, he argued that he had no fiduciary duty to a nonshareholder-
purchaser.28 The Commission rejected this argument, stating that com-
mon law principles of fiduciary relationships are not coextensive with
the duty to disclose under rule lOb-5.
29
In imposing "insider" status on the broker, the Commission estab-
lished a two-part test to determine when a duty to disclose nonpublic
information exists under rule lOb-5. 30 First, the person must have a
relationship to a company that gives him access to information in-
tended to be available only for a legitimate corporate purpose.31 Sec-
ond, private use of this information must be "inherently unfair.
'32
B. The EqualAccess Theory
In SEC v. Texas Guff Sulphur Co. 33 the Second Circuit extended the
24. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
25. Id at 909.
26. Id
27. Id
28. Id at 913.
29. Id
30.- The Commission emphasized the remedial nature of the federal laws. Id at 910.
31. Id at 913-14. The Commission stated:
Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law based on the view that an officer
or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he
purchases but not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate
to introduce these [distinctions] into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the
securities acts.
Id. at 913-14 (footnote omitted).
32. Id at 912. In Cady, Roberts the SEC treated the broker as an insider because he had
gained inside information through a special business contact. Id The Commission stated: "[O]ur
task here is to identify those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to
its internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities. Intimacy de-
mands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited." Id
33. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas GuifSulphur,
several officers and directors purchased additional shares in their company's stock based on confi-
dential information concerning a possible mineral strike. In addition, the defendants selectively
disclosed the information to a number of individuals who also purchased shares. Id. at 839-43.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol62/iss3/5
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scope of rule lOb-5 to cover any person in possession of inside informa-
tion.34 Although the Commission named only traditional insiders as
defendants,35 the Second Circuit shifted away from the relational focus
of Cady, Robert 6 to enunciate a broad "equal access" theory.37 This
theory provides that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
should have relatively equal access to material38 information.39 Under
the court's analysis, an outsider in receipt of confidential information
acquires a duty to "disclose or abstain" from trading.4 °
The Second Circuit again applied the equal access theory in Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Ic. 41 Merrill Lynch agreed
to underwrite a Douglas Aircraft Company debenture offering.42 In its
underwriting capacity, Merrill Lynch learned that Douglas' earnings
had declined.43 Before the information became public, Merrill Lynch
34. Id at 848.
35. Id at 852-53. In dicta the court suggested that the defendants' tippees may be liable for
trading on inside information. ld
36. The court purported to apply the Cady, Roberts test. In quoting the test, however, the
Texas (hu//court deleted the requirement of a "relationship" to the corporation. See id at 848
(citing Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
37. The equal access theory has generated considerable controversy. Compare Brudney, In-
siders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L.
Rav. 322, 346 (1976) (informational advantages deprive investors of ability to compete) with
Koeltl & Kubek, Chiarella and Market Information, 13 REv. SEC. REG. (S & P) 903, 905 (1980)
("equal access" theory ignores Cady, Roberts requirement of relationship to company).
38. Rule lOb-5 covers only material inside information. See, e.g., SEC v. MacDonald, 699
F.2d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 1983). The test for materiality is whether there is "a substantial likelihood
that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the
deliberations of a reasonable shareholder." TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976).
The proposed Federal Securities Code would change the test to one focusing on whether a fact
is of "special significance." FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 1603(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1978). The
Code defines such a fact as one which, "in addition to being material, would be likely, if made
available, to affect the market price of a security to a significant extent." Id § 202(56).
39. 401 F.2d at 848. The court noted that rule lOb-5 is based "on the justifiable expectation
of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively
equal access to material information .... " Id
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). Shortly after Texas -ulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit ap-
peared to repudiate the equal access principle in General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403
F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). The court stated: "We know of no rule
of law . . that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a
prospective seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands
and thus abort the sale." Id. at 164. In Merrill Lync4 however, the Second Circuit clearly em-
braced the Texas Gulf Sulphur approach. See infra text accompanying note 49.
42. 495 F.2d at 232.
43. Id
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tipped certain institutional investors.' The tippees then sold their
Douglas securities, thereby avoiding a loss that uninformed members
of the public suffered.45 The Second Circuit held, in part, that the "dis-
close-or-abstain" prohibition of rule lOb-5 applied to Merrill Lynch. 6
The court stated that Merrill Lynch breached its lOb-5 duty by selec-
tively disclosing inside information. 7 Moreover, because Merrill
Lynch's tippees enjoyed special access to inside information, they vio-
lated the rule by trading prior to public disclosure.48 Under the equal
access test, the court found the Shapiro insiders liable although they
had disclosed inside information only for legitimate business reasons.
49
C. The Supreme Court's Emphasis on the Existence of a Fiduciary
Duty and the Rejection of the Equal Access Theory
The Supreme Court rejected the Texas Gulf-Shapiro equal access
theory in Chiarella v. United States." In Chiarella the Court reversed
the conviction of a printer's employee who allegedly had violated sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5.1' The printer's corporate clients had deleted
the names of the aggressors and targets on announcements of takeover
bids to protect the confidentiality of the bids. 2 On five occasions, how-
ever, the defendant deduced the identities of the target companies and
purchased shares before the bids were disclosed to the public.5 3 The
Court held that the "disclose-or-abstain" rule of lOb-5 applies only to
individuals under an independent duty to disclose such information.
5 4
This duty arises only through the existence of a fiduciary55 relationship
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id at 238.
47. Id
48. Id The court held both the Merrill Lynch tippers and their tippees liable in damages to
those who purchased Douglas securities prior to public disclosure of the adverse earnings infor-
mation. Id
49. Id at 232, 238.
50. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
51. Id at 224.
52. Id In the course of his employment, the printer received the names on the night of the
final printing. Id
53. Id
54. Id at 235.
55. The term "fiduciary" eludes precise definition. In the broadest sense, it refers "to any
person who occupies a position of peculiar confidence toward another. It refers to integrity and
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between the person possessing inside information and the issuer.56 The
Court made only a passing reference to tippee liability, asserting that a
tippee who traded on material, nonpublic information would be a "par-
ticipant after the fact" in the tipper-insider's violation of rule lOb-5.57
The Court directly confronted the issue of tippee liability three years
later in Dirks v. SEC.58 In Dirks, a former employee59 of Equity Fund-
56. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
57. 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). Pre-Chiarella courts divided on the theoretical justification
for tippee liability. See Block & Solovy, Developments Under Rules l0b-5 and 14e-3, 2 FOUR-
TEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 387-88 (1982). Those courts that did not predicate liability on a
fiduciary duty to the issuer often viewed tippees as primary actors. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974) (no distinction between
liability for tipping and trading); Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 644 (1971) (tippee's
duty based on unequal access to corporate information). These courts tended to treat the tipper as
an aider and abettor of the tippee's breach of duty. See generally Levine, Ferrigno, Watters &
Mann, Insider Trading: 4 Forty-Eight Year Assessment, 2 FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG.
451 (1982) (summarizes theoretical basis for holding tippees liable under lOb-5). A number of
courts and commentators, however, viewed the insider-tipper's breach as primary. See, e.g., SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (tippee's trading may be as
"reprehensible" as insider's violation), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). For example, the SEC
contended that an outsider's failure to trade did not absolve the tipper of liability. See, e.g.,
Faberge, Inc., 45 S.E.C. 249, 257 (1973) (tipping alone violates rule 10b-5); Langevoort, Insider
Trading and the Fiduciary Princple." A Post Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28 n. 11
(1982) ("better view is that selective disclosure is itself a breach"). See also 5A A. JACOBS, THE
IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 167, at 7-5 (1980) (summarizes Commission's pre-Chiarella position).
The Commission would impose liability even though the tipper's fraud is unconnected with the
"purchase or sale of a security." See id (criticizes SEC's position). Of course, the theory cannot
create a private cause of action, for without trading no damages arise. Elkind v. Liggitt & Meyers,
Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 1980).
Most courts have followed Chiarellds "after the fact" language in indicating that tippee liability
is secondary. See, e.g., Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Fla.
1981) (tippees liable as participants after the fact); Kulla v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 426 So. 2d 1055,
1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (same). Some courts, however, have continued to treat tippees as
primarily liable despite the absence of an independent duty. Block & Solovy, supra, at 389-90.
See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1981) (held
tipper and tippee liable without mention of Chiarella).
Dirks follows Chiarella in asserting that the tippee's fiduciary duty to the issuer is secondary.
103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 (1983). See generally Block & Solovy, supra, at 390-91 (discussing competing
theoretical views of tippee liability).
58. 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983).
59. The Court assumed, without discussion, that Ronald Secrist, theformer employee, was an
insider of Equity Funding. Traditional principles of agency law provide only superficial support
for the Court's assumption. After the termination of an agency relationship, the agent cannot
exploit confidential information previously acquired. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 396(c),(d) (1959). See also H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PART-
NERSHIP § 68, at 123 (1979) (former employee prohibited from using trade secrets). An agent's
unauthorized use of confidential information creates a cause of action in favor of the former em-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ing, Inc. (EFCA), Ronald Secrist, passed inside information to Ray-
mond Dirks, an investment adviser, to expose a massive criminal
fraud.60  Dirks investigated the allegations, verified the fraud's exist-
ence, and promptly advised his institutional clients of his findings.
6t
Five clients consequently liquidated their EFCA holdings. 62 After
public exposure of the EFCA fraud, the SEC brought a criminal action
against Dirks, alleging that his selective disclosure of confidential infor-
mation violated rule lOb-5.63 The SEC found Dirks guilty, but only
censured him' because of his role in bringing the EFCA fraud to
light.65
The Supreme Court absolved Dirks of liability because he was not a
fiduciary of EFCA's shareholders.6 6 The Court reasoned that Dirks'
informant had not acted improperly67 because the informant had made
no "secret profit" from the tip.68 The Court found no derivative breach
by Dirks because the insider-tipper had breached no duty to EFCA's
ployer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(c) & comment g (1959) (use of trade
secrets provides basis for restitution claim). In Dirks, the Court should have distinguished be-
tween insiders in criminal and civil cases. Secrist was an insider to the extent that he was under a
duty to account to Equity Funding for profits obtained from his tip. The Court's extension of
Secrist's duty to account for a criminal prosecution is not supportable. See Legal Times, July 11,
1983, at I, col. I (suggests Court's assumption of insider status is mistaken).
60. 103 S. Ct. at 3258, 3268. The majority contended that Secrist advised Dirks to announce
the fraud publicly. Id Justice Blackmun, however, believed that Secrist tipped Dirks, hoping that
Dirks would selectively disclose the information to his clients whose heavy selling would cause a
dramatic drop in EFCA's market price and thus cause public attention to focus on EFCA. Id. at
3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Even under Justice Blackmun's interpretation of the record, how-
ever, the insider received no personal gain from the disclosure. Id
61. Id at 3258. Dirks also urged The Wall Street Journalto expose the scheme. The newspa-
per, however, declined Dirks' request. Id
62. Id
63. Id at 3259.
64. Id at 3259. The Commission also found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of
§ 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which contains language virtually identical to that of rule
lob-5. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(a) (1982). Section 17(a), however, does not apply to purchasers of
securities. See id
65. The Supreme Court disagreed on the importance of Dirks' role in exposing the Equity
Funding fraud. The majority described Dirks' role as "important," 103 S. Ct. at 3259 & nn. 8, 18,
while Justice Blackmun suggested that Dirks' contribution was minor. Id at 3273 & n.15 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 3266-67.
67. Id at 3267-68.
68. Id The Court held that an insider's tip is improper only if he benefits personally. Id at
3265. The benefit may be to the tippee's finances or reputation. Id In dissent, Justice Blackmun




shareholders. 69  In footnote fourteen to the Dirks' opinion, however,
the Court noted that certain individuals occupying a special relation-
ship with a corporation may be considered as tippers, rather than as
tippees, for purposes of determining the existence of a duty to disclose
under rule lOb-5.
70
Under Chiarella and Dirks, if an individual does not owe a direct or
derivative duty to a corporation, he cannot be liable under rule lOb-5
for trading on material, nonpublic information.7 The Chiarella char-
acterization of a tippee as a "participant after the fact" in an insider's
violation72 would have led to absurd consequences in the absence of
footnote fourteen.73  No derivative breach occurs when a tippee re-
ceives confidential information for a legitimate purpose, as in Dirks.74
In most situations, however, a tippee should not be free to exploit such
information for his own personal benefit.75  Footnote fourteen, how-
ever, provides a workable framework for analyzing such conduct.76
69. Id
70. Id at 3261 n. 14, 3264. See also 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5, § 167, at 7-4
(1975) (tippee liable only if he knew insider's disclosure constituted breach of trust). Justice Pow-
el suggested that selective disclosure of confidential information promotes efficiency in the stock
market. 103 S. Ct. at 3263 n.17. The argument, however, has its critics. Compare H. MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (insider trading promotes efficiency in the
market) with W. PAINTER, THE FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 5.10
(1979) (prompt disclosure of confidential information promotes efficiency in the market).
71. See supra notes 54-57 & 66-70 and accompanying text.
72. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980). See supra text accompanying
note 57.
73. But see Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 64 n. 54, col. 2 (footnote fourteen is corollary of
"participant after fact" theory). The article confuses the distinction between primary and secon-
dary liability. See cases cited supra note 57.
74. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
75. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir. 1974)
(rule lob-5 designed to promote informed judgments by all investors); Radiation Dynamics, Inc.
v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972) (10b-5 prevents tippees from abusing informa-
tional privileges).
76. After Chiarella, courts tended to ignore the "participant after the fact" theory in order to
hold "constructive insiders" liable under lOb-5. See generallyW. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPO-
RATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 11.06, at 54 (3d ed. Supp. 1982) (pre-Dirks liability of construc-
tive fiduciaries). For cases holding attorneys liable under rule lOb-5, decided between Chiarella
and Dirks, see SEC v. Martin Cooper, No. 82-3462 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 1982) (consent) (attorney
traded on information received from banker); SEC v. O'Connell, No. 80-6183 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30,
1980) (consent) (attorney traded in securities of target company after learning that it approved
takeover bid).
After Dirks, the Southern District of New York upheld the guilty plea of Carlos Florentino, an
attorney. He allegedly purchased stock in nine companies based on confidential information.
SEC v. Florentino, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99, 465 (S.D.N.Y.
Number 3]
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II. HORIZONTAL SCOPE OF FOOTNOTE FOURTEEN
A. Introduction
The language of footnote fourteen suggests that it applies to a limited
class of professionals. The footnote states in part: "Under certain cir-
cumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed legiti-
mately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working
for the corporation, these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders."77 Because the Court undoubtedly did not intend this list
to be exhaustive,7 considerable controversy has arisen concerning the
footnote's scope. Officials in the SEC, for example, have hailed the
footnote as a powerful device to deter insider trading,79 while others
have argued that Dirks as a whole presents a serious threat to the Com-
mission's enforcement efforts.8 0
B. The Fiduciary Framework
Footnote fourteen recognizes the fiduciary duties of certain classes of
outsiders to an issuer. In doing so, the Dirks Court logically extends
the Cady, Roberts-Chiarella requirement of a special relationship pro-
viding access to corporate information."' Traditional insiders, such as
Sept. 7, 1983). For a discussion of the safeguards subsequently implemented by Florentino's firm,
see Nat'l L.J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 25, cols. 1 & 2.
Post-Chiarella courts also prohibited accountants from trading on inside information. See, e.g.,
SEC v. Martin, No. C82-381 (W.D. Wash. April 7, 1982) (consent) (traded in targets of takeover
bids on information obtained by clients); SEC v. Davidowitz, No. 81-4857 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6,
1981) (consent) (same). For cases holding broker-dealers liable under 1Ob-5, see SEC v. Fabregas,
No. 82-3440 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 1982) (consent) (tipper); SEC V. Roussel, 1980 FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 97,531 (D. Kan. 1980) (consent) (manager of tender offeror purchased target's shares).
77. Dirkr v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14.
78. See Comment, Topee Liability Under Rule 10b-5 Predicated On Whether Tipper Tos to
Secure Personal Gain, Dirks v. SEC, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 165, 173 n.46 (1984).
79. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Phillip Parker, an associate director of the
SEC Enforcement Division, concedes that the misappropriation theory remains a more powerful
theory than the "constructive insider" principle. Telephone interview with Phillip Parker (Feb. 8,
1984). See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text (discussing the misappropriation theory).
80. See, e.g., Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REv. SEc. REG. (S & P) 841,
841 (1983) (Dirks"sharply limited" SEC's regulation of tippees); Wall St. J., July 5, 1983, at 5, col.
1 (Dirks "will make it harder for the SEC"). Because of concern over the Dirks decision, the
House Energy & Commerce Committee directed the SEC to provide a report, including "(1) the
number of insider trading cases brought, settled, and tried; (2) the propositions for which counsel
cited Dirks in representing clients accused of insider trading; and (3) a summary and analysis of
lower court decisions citing and interpreting Dirks." H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1983).
81. See supra notes 24-32 & 50-57 and accompanying text.
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corporate officers and directors, are agents8 2 of the corporation. 3  As
agents, they owe duties of loyalty84 and care8 5 to the corporate entity
and derivatively to its shareholders.8 6 Certain outsiders, such as attor-
neys and underwriters, serve the issuer in a capacity that creates the
same relationship of trust and confidence with the company.87 These
persons, by virtue of their preexisting fiduciary relationships with the
issuer, cannot exploit corporate opportunities for their personal advan-
tage.88 Hence, footnote fourteen also prohibits these individuals from
trading on confidential corporate information. 9
The footnote does not expand the class of persons considered to be
corporate fiduciaries. 90 Footnote fourteen merely recognizes that cer-
tain outsiders have a sufficiently close nexus to the corporation that
82. An "agent" is a person authorized to execute contracts on behalf of the principal. H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 49 (1979).
83. Eg., G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 16, at 94, 98 (2d
ed. 1965); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 224, at 593 (3d ed. 1983). See,
e.g., Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219-20, 222 N.W. 2d 71, 78 (1974) (agency relationship un-
derlies corporate opportunity doctrine); New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y.
209, 216-17, 155 N.E. 102, 104 (1926) (agency relationship underlies prohibition against self-deal-
ing). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958) (individual director not agent of
corporation). -
84. See, e.g., New York Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 216, 155 N.E. 102,
104 (1926) (liability for self-dealing determined by common law agency principles). See also
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 41 (1980) ("Director Conflicts of Interest").
85. See, e.g., Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 699 (1940) (bank directors negligent in ap-
proving repurchase option pursuant to sale of securities). Compare id with Schlensky v. Wrigley,
95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 182-83, 237 N.E.2d 776, 781 (1968) (directors not negligent in refusing to
install lights in baseball stadium). See generally W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY § 401 (1949)
(agent's obligation to exercise due care).
86. Langevoort, supra note 57, at 20. This list does not exhaust the duties owed by corporate
agents. For example, common-law principles prohibit directors from favoring one class of stock-
holders at the expense of another. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 46-47 (3d
Cir. 1947) (corporation redeemed one class of equity securities at expense of another class).
87. Langevoort, supra note 57, at 19-20.
88. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 301 Minn. 207, 219, 222 N.W.2d 71, 78 (1974). The court in
Miller stated: "[One entrusted with the active management of a corporation, such as an officer or
director, occupies a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and may not exploit his position as an
'insider' by appropriating to himself a business opportunity properly belonging to the corpora-
tion." Id
89. See ABA Comment Letter on Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973), reprinted
in 233 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) D-2 & D5-D6 (outsiders' exploitation of inside information
constitutes disregard of "legitimate business expectations of confidentiality").
90. See H. BAKER, R. BARRON, & H. HAvELAs JR., REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS
AND SECURITIES MARKETS 1 2.14 [2], at S2-76 (Supp. 1983) (footnote fourteen "useful guide" to
determining presence of fiduciary duty).
Washington University Open Scholarship
488 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
they acquire fiduciary responsibilities.9 The scope of footnote four-
teen thus depends on the nature of fiduciary relationships. Under
traditional agency principles, an agency relationship arises only on the
mutual assent of the principal and agent.92 This concept is the corner-
stone of all consensual fiduciary relationships.93 The Dirks footnote im-
plicitly endorses the mutual assent requirement in two ways. First, the
footnote requires that the issuer justifiably expect the information to
remain confidential.94 Second, the footnote's requirement of a "special
confidential relationship" between the outsider and the corporation
supplies this justification.95
This "special confidential relationship" requires the fiduciary's con-
sent96 and an implicit agreement to serve the beneficiary with utmost
loyalty.97 The fiduciary, moreover, must occupy a position of domi-
nance over the principal.98 The relationship between a corporation and
an outsider satisfies these requirements only if the latter is under a pre-
existing duty to protect the confidentiality of corporate information.
The duty exists only if the outsider actually or constructively consents
to it. Actual consent arises through the existence of a contractual rela-
91. See ABA Comment Letter on Material, Non-Public Information, supra note 89, at D-6
(advisors have "required nexus" to corporation to preclude exploitation of confidential
information).
92. E.g., M. FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 13 (1954); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 15 (1959). See, e.g., Valley View Cattle Co. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 548 F.2d
1219, 1221 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977) (agency status created by contract or opera-
tion of law); Eitel v. Schmidlapp, 459 F.2d 609, 614 (4th Cir. 1972) (intention of parties "signifi-
cant element" in determining whether agency relationship exists).
93. See, e.g., Smith v. Merck, 206 Ga. 361, 368-69, 57 S.E.2d 326, 332 (1950) (agent is fiduci-
ary of principal). See generally H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP § 67 (1979) ("The Agent as Fiduciary").
94. Footnote fourteen states in part: "For such a duty to be imposed, however, the corpora-
tion must expect the outsider to keep the disclosed nonpublic information confidential, and the
relationshp at least must imply such a duty." 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983) (emphasis added).
95. The footnote provides: "The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that
such person acquired nonpublic information, but rather that they have entered into a special confi-
dentialrelationsh&p in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to informa-
tion solely for corporate purposes." Id (emphasis added).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 15 comment b (1959) (person becomes fidu-
ciary only if he consents).
97. SeeG. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 86, at 315 (5th ed. 1973) (fiduciary owes
duty of loyalty to beneficiary). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment a
(1959) (agent cannot profit by using confidential information); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§ 200 (1937); (same prohibition applies to all fiduciaries); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oP TRUSTS § 2
comment b (1959) (fiduciary under duty to act for principal's benefit).
98. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 86, at 315 (5th ed. 1973).
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tionship.99 Constructive consent occurs by virtue of the outsider's pre-
existing ethical duties to his corporate client."°°
Typically a contract is insufficient to create a fiduciary relation-
ship. 10 1 Ordinary business relationships contain no expectations of
confidentiality and the parties' rights are freely transferable." 2 Courts,
however, have historically attached extraordinary importance to cer-
tain types of consensual relationships, such as that existing between an
employer and employee. An elementary principle of both agency
10 3
and securities law"° provides that an employee possesses fiduciary du-
ties to his superior with respect to confidential information acquired in
the course of employment. For example, the Dirks Court assumed
without discussion that Secrist, a former employee of Equity Funding,
was an "insider."'' 0 5 Because many outsiders serve corporate clients in
a capacity similar to that of an employee, a distinction between "em-
ployees" and "independent contractors"' ° can be misleading. For ex-
99. See, e.g., Lord v. Jackman, 206 Kan. 22, 28, 476 P.2d 596, 600-01 (1970) (consent to
agency relationship may be express or implied); Busby v. Walker, 84 So. 2d 304, 307 (La. Ct. App.
1955) (same).
100. Cf. Kennedy v. Justus, 64 N.M. 131, 134, 325 P.2d 716, 718 (1958) (agency relationship
created by mutual consent or operation of law); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Zupnik, 32 Ohio App.
138, 141 (1929) (same). The terms "actual" and "constructive" consent are of the author's own
invention.
101. See, e.g., Thomson v. Wheeler Constr. Co., 385 P.2d 111, 114 (Ala. 1963) (no fiduciary
relationship between parties to construction contract). See also G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 17, at 107 (2d ed. 1965). The authors state: "While one does
not enter into a contract with another unless he trusts and has confidence in him, contract and
debt amount to a business and not to a fiduciary relationship." Id
102. G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, upra note 83, § 17, at 107.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1959). See, e.g., Textile Rubber & Chem.
Co. v. Shook, 243 Ga. 587, 590, 255 S.E.2d 705, 708 (1979) (trade secrets); Packard Instrument Co.
v. Reich, 89 IM. App. 3d 908, 917, 412 N.E.2d 617, 623-24 (1980) (same).
104. See, e.g., Memorandum of the SEC in Support of the Insider Trading Sanctions of 1982,
reprintedin FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 442 n.4 (1982) ("insiders" includes employees
of the issuer).
105. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3267 (1983). See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
106. The distinction is relevant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, which refers to an em-
ployer's vicarious liability for torts committed by his "servants." Eg., Dickson v. Graham-Jones
Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309, 310 (Fla. 1955); M. FERSON, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 25 (1954); H.
REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 52, at 101 (1979); W.
SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 129 (1949). The Restatement (Second) of Agency enumerates a
number of factors that distinguish "servants" from "independent contractors." See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1959). The most important consideration is the employer's power
to control the details of the assignment. Eg., Dickson v. Graham-Jones Paper Co., 84 So. 2d 309,
310 (Fla. 1955). For a historical analysis of the respondeat superior doctrine, see M. FERSON,
PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 6 (1954).
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ample, when a consulting analyst acquires access to secret corporate
information, he remains an "independent contractor" although he oc-
cupies a position of special trust and confidence to the company.' 0 7
The outsider's acceptance of this position justifies the company's expec-
tation of confidentiality., 08
The company's expectation is equally justified when the outsider is
ethically obligated to protect the confidentiality of corporate informa-
tion.' 09 The clearest evidence of an ethical duty is its codification in a
professional code."10 For example, self-regulating organizations im-
107. In this respect, the consulting analyst resembles a number of outside corporate advisers,
all of whom should be considered constructive insiders. These advisers include engineers, testing
laboratories, underwriters, and public relations consultants. See, e.g., Investors Management Co.,
44 S.E.C. 633, 645 (1971), cited in Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983) (prospective
underwriter cannot disclose corporate information); C. ABELES, B. PRICE & T. SCHWAB, INSIDE
INFORMATION: PREVENTION OF ABUSE A-12 (1979) (pre-Chiarella definition of "insiders" in-
cludes engineers and testing laboratories); AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE DISCLOSURE POLICIES
§ 402(6) (1970) (public relations consultants treated as insiders). Similarly, the Comptroller of the
Currency prohibits banks from exploiting inside information. 12 C.F.R. § 9.7 (d) (1983) provides
as follows:
Every national bank exercising fiduciary powers shall adopt written policies and proce-
dures to ensure that the Federal securities laws are complied with in connection with any
decision or recommendation to purchase or sell any security. Such policies and proce-
dures, in particular, shall ensure the national bank trust departments shall not use mate-
rial inside information in connection with any decision or recommendation to purchase
or sell any security.
See also Fed. Reserve Bd., Policy Statement Concerning Use of Inside Information, 64 FED. RE-
SERVE BULL. 339, 340 (1978) (use of inside information to trade in securities is "an unsafe and
unsound banking practice").
108. The outsider's access to confidential information creates an agency relationship with the
principal. In this respect, the duties of employees and analysts are the same. The Restatement of
Agency states:
[M]ost of the persons known as agents, that is, brokers, factors, attorneys, collection
agencies, and selling agencies are independent contractors. . . since they are contractors
but, although employed to perform services, are not subject to the control or right to
control of the principal with respect to their physical conduct in the performance of the
services. However, they fall within the category of agents. They arefiduciaries; they owe
to the principal the basic obligations of agency loyalty and obedience.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N comment a (1958) (emphasis added).
109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Levine, Ferrigno, Watters & Mann,
Insider Trading:.A Fory-Eight YearAssessment, in 2 FOURTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 451,
541 (1982). The article states: "[The high ethical standards. . . of law, accounting and accepta-
ble business practices and policies all mandate that the confidentiality of non-public information
be preserved and that such information not be used as the basis for trading in securities." Id.
110. Professional codes serve a dual function. First, they provide guidance as to what consti-
tutes acceptable conduct. See, e.g., Patterson, Wanted- 4 New Code of Professional Responsibiliy,
in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 21 (2d ed. 1981) (ABA Code "not
for bad lawyers but for good lawyers"). Second, the codes serve as objective standards for mea-
suring ethical violations. For example, the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility "points the
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pose a duty on attorneys"1' and certified public accountants1 2 to pro-
tect the confidentiality of client communications. The ABA's Code of
Judicial Conduct similarly prohibits judges from exploiting informa-
tion acquired in an official capacity." 3
The same result should occur outside these self-regulated professions
when the nature of the outsider's activities implies an ethical duty of
confidentiality. In such cases, the absence of a professional code makes
necessary a clear showing that public policy or societal expectations
require the recipients of information to protect its confidentiality." 4
way to the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor." MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981). But c/ MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Preamble (Final Draft 1983) (violation of ethical rules does not, in itself, create cause of
action).
111, The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer should not use infor-
mation acquired in the course of the representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client and
a lawyer should not use, except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, such information
for his own purposes." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-5 (1981), see also
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1981) (prohibits disclosure of con-
fidential client information in most circumstances); S( CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon
37 (superseded 1970) (pre-Code duty to preserve client's confidences).
112. J. CAREY & W. DOHERTY, ETHICAL STANDARDS OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 134
(1966). The American Institute of Certified Public Accounts (AICPA) codified this rule. Ac-
countants cannot disclose confidential information about their clients except (1) when necessary to
avoid violation of accounting standards, (2) when necessary to comply with a valid subpoena or
summons, or (3) in connection with a voluntary AICPA or state investigation. AICPA PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS ET 301.01 (1981); cf RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 16 (1950)
(members "shall not violate the confidential [client] relationship"). Nineteen states have created
an accountant-client privilege by statute. D. CAUSEY, JR., DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS 60 (1982).
113. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(7) (1979) provides: "Information acquired by
a judge in his judicial capacity should not be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for
any other purpose not related to his judicial duties." Id. The rule originated in the judge's fiduci-
ary capacity. R. WISE, LEGAL ETHICS 653 n.9 (Supp. 1979).
114. Cf. Rodgers v. Arapahoe Pipe Line Co., 185 Kan. 424, 430, 345 P.2d 702, 707 (1959)
(party claiming benefit of agency relationship must demonstrate its existence by "clear and satis-
factory evidence"). Courts should require such a showing because privileges of confidentiality
occasionally impede the administration of justice. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF
CONDUCT Preface (Rev. Draft 1982) (lawyer's duty of confidentiality sometimes impedes justice).
Professional codes provide objective standards to determine acceptable behavior. Without such
a rule, measurement of ethical conduct becomes a rather esoteric enterprise. In the context of
legal ethics, one commentator states:
The problems of legal ethics are those between right and right, not between right and
wrong, for genuine ethical problems always create a dilemma for the lawyer. The basic
duties-loyalty, candor, and fairness-all conflict with each other if carried to their logi-
cal extremes, and the question of the right thing to do in a particular situation is a matter
of degree. This means that the solution to the problem is a matter of sound judgment.
Patterson, Wanted" A New Code of Professional Responsibility, in T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA,
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For example, to allow government officials to trade on inside informa-
tion could seriously undermine public confidence in those officials."'
Furthermore, imposition of a fiduciary duty encourages corporate com-
pliance with governmental investigations.' 1 6 Courts should thus treat
government officials as trustees of information they acquire in the
course of public service. 17 This ethical duty of confidentiality trans-
lates into a duty to abstain from trading pursuant to footnote
fourteen." 1 8
C. The Boundaries of Fiduciary Duty
The class of "constructive insiders" should not extend beyond those
persons who contractually or constructively agree to enter a "special
confidential relationship" with the corporation. The court's opinion in
SEC v. Lund 9 illustrates the danger of a broad interpretation of foot-
note fourteen. Horowitz and Lund were co-directors of Verit Indus-
tries.' 20 Horowitz was also the president of P & F Industries, Inc.'21 P
& F negotiated with another company concerning a possible joint ven-
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 21 (2d ed. 1981). Moreover, the presence of objective standards
promotes enforcement of ethical norms. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
into the Resvonsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 822-23 (1973) (self-
regulated professions are easily policed). These considerations support a restrictive reading of
footnote fourteen in the absence of easily identifiable ethical standards. Otherwise, an unwork-
able burden falls on the regulatory authorities charged with enforcement of rule lOb-5. In each
case, these authorities would have to identify and weigh policy considerations favoring an ethical
duty of confidentiality. See SEC v. Monarch Fund, 608 F.2d 938, 942 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (insiders
under duty to disclose because they "are readily identified and easily policed").
115. The judiciary provides one illustration. The prohibition against judges' trading on confi-
dential information fosters respect for the judicial system. See supra note 113 and accompanying
text; V/ CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) (1979) (ethical rules designed to promote public
confidence in judiciary).
116. Cf. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531, 545-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (govern-
ment's evidentiary privilege concerning investigations designed to promote law enforcement).
117. See Langevoort, supra note 57, at 34-35 (government official owes fiduciary duty to public
investors); see also 15 U.S.C § 78x (1976) (SEC members prohibited from exploiting information
acquired in investigation); 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) (disclosure of confidential information by fed-
eral employee is felony). The policy considerations behind judges' ethical duties of confidentiality
are equally applicable to all government officials. See supra notes 113 & 115 and accompanying
text.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983) (footnote fourteen includes govern-
ment officials). But see N.Y.L.J., August 17, 1983, at 2, cols. 4 & 5 (government officials under no
fiduciary duty to issuer's shareholders).
119. 570 F. Supp. 1397 (C.D. Cal. 1983).




ture involving the establishment of a gambling casino. 122 Horowitz, on
behalf of P & F, asked Lund if his company would help finance the
venture.'23 Lund rejected the offer, but purchased shares in P & F on
the basis of this information.' 24 The SEC sought an injunction and
disgorgement of profits, claiming that Lund violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 by trading on inside information.
125
The court quoted footnote fourteen and held that Lund was a con-
structive insider of P & F. 26 Thus, Lund could not trade in P & F
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information.1 27 The court
reasoned that the friendship between Lund and Horowitz created a
"special relationship" within the meaning of footnote fourteen. 28
Moreover, the court asserted that their personal relationship implied
that the information was to be kept confidential. 29 The court con-
cluded that Lund's receipt of the information created a duty to disclose
or abstain from trading.
130
The Lund court misconstrued the nature of footnote fourteen.' 3 1 Al-
though Lund and Horowitz may have enjoyed a confidential relation-
ship, 32 the court erroneously fit their relationship within footnote
fourteen. First, Lund's relationship was not with P & F, but with
Horowitz. Footnote fourteen requires a special confidential relation-
ship between the outsider (Lund) and the issuer (P & F). 33 The en-
trance of certain outsiders "into a special confidential relationship in
122. Id
123. Id at 1400.
124. Id Lund purchased 10,000 shares of P & F common stock at $1.25 per share. After P & F
publicly announced the merger, Lund sold his P & F stock at a price averaging $2.50 per share.
Id
125. Id at 1399. The SEC initiated the action under three independent theories: (i) insider
liability, (ii) tippee liability, and (iii) misappropriation. After the Supreme Court decided Dirks,
the SEC withdrew its allegation of tippee liability, for Horowitz had tipped Lund solely to secure
investment capital. The parties submitted supplemental briefs discussing the impact of Dirks. Id
at 1399 n.j.
126. Id at 1402-03.




131. The SEC considers Lunda "major victory" that illustrates the utility of footnote fourteen.
15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 38, 1818 (Sept. 30, 1983).
132. Lund conceded this point. See Defendant's Opposition Post-Trial Memorandum of Law
at 9.
133. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
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the conduct of the business of the enterprise"'' 34 constitutes the justifi-
cation for footnote fourteen. Lund's rejection of Horowitz's invitation
to enter a business relationship with P & F 35 did not create the "special
confidential relationship" required under footnote fourteen. Lund,
moreover, was not a fiduciary of Horowitz, 36 for friendship alone does
not create a fiduciary relationship. 37 Although the two friends had a
confidential relationship, 38 confidentiality does not create a fiduciary
relationship without the recipient's consent.
139
Lundillustrates the danger of applying footnote fourteen to persons
who would not otherwise be corporate fiduciaries. The Lund court im-
posed a duty on the defendant to abstain from trading solely because
he had received confidential information. Chiarella expressly rejected
this theory. 40 Lund's expansive reading of footnote fourteen threatens
to revive the Texas Gufequal access theory despite the Court's clear
intention to put that theory to rest.' 4' The class of constructive insiders
properly includes only those outsiders with preexisting contractual or
ethical duties to refrain from exploiting confidential corporate
information.
14 2
III. VERTICAL SCOPE OF FOOTNOTE FOURTEEN
A. Introduction
The duty of confidentiality does not bar constructive insiders from
exposing their employees to sensitive client information. 43 The SEC
134. Id (citations omitted).
135. 570 F. Supp. at 1400
136. Defendant's Opposition Post-Trial Memorandum of Law at 10.
137. Recent Decisions, Applicability of Insider Responsibility to Broker in Possession of Inside
Corporate Information, 60 MICH. L. REv. 651, 654 (1962). See also G. BOGERT & G. BOOERT,
LAW OF TRUSTS § 86, at 315 (5th ed. 1973) (family relationship creates duty of loyalty if position
of dominance and superiority). But see Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(close friends of controlling stockholders are insiders).
138. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 50 & 54-56 and accompanying text.
141. See text accompanying notes 54-56 & 66-68.
142. The proposed Federal Securities Code would extend the coverage of rule lob-5 even
further. It covers "a person whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave
him access to a fact of special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally
available." FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b)(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
143. The duty of confidentiality does not prohibit the fiduciary from using confidential infor-
mation for the principal's own benefit. Eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 comment b
(1959); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 200 comment a (1937). The employee's exposure to
[Vol. 62:477
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contends that such employees inherit from their employers a fiduciary
responsibility to keep client information confidential. 1" Under this
view, employees become constructive fiduciaries of the client and
thereby acquire a duty to abstain from trading in the client's securi-
ties. 145 For example, a law firm's fiduciary duties would vertically ex-
tend to all its employees. 46 The law firm provides a useful model for
exploring the vertical scope of the Dirks footnote. 147
B. The Apparent Paradox
A fiduciary duty extends to all those with a preexisting ethical or
contractual relationship with the issuer. 148 An attorney has an ethical
duty to maintain the confidences of his firm's corporate clients even
though he did not directly receive inside information. 149 The law firm's
client information should redound to the client's benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 5 comment b (1959) (agent can delegate power, even though he remains primarily
responsible toward the principal). For example, the ABA Model Rules expressly permit lawyers
to discuss client affairs with other employees of the firm. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6 comment (Final Draft 1983).
144. Telephone interview with Phillip Parker, Associate Director, SEC Enforcement Division
(Feb. 8, 1984).
145. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
146. See Insider Trading by Law Firm Employees, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
13,437 (Apr. 8, 1977). The release states:
The antifraud provisions of the Federal securities laws ... mandate that the confidenti-
ality of non-public information be preserved and in particular that such information not
be used as the basis for trading in securities. This obligation extends not only to partners
in the law frm but also to associated lawyers and service personnel employed by the firm.
Id (emphasis added). The Commission has recently initiated a major crackdown against insider
trading by nonlawyer employees of large firms. N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1984, at 25, col. 1.
147. An analogous "vertical problem" involves multi-service brokerage houses. These institu-
tions typically maintain separate departments involving corporate acquisitions and personal in-
vestment advice. E.g., Herzel & Colling, The Chinese WallRevisited, 6 CORP. L. REv. 116 (1983).
The acquisitions and underwriting departments regularly receive material inside information.
When brokerage houses maintain a fiduciary relationship with an issuer, they become constructive
insiders under footnote fourteen. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 43 S.E.C. 933,
937 (1968) (managing underwriter cannot disclose inside information to other departments). As a
result, multiservice securities firms usually erect "Chinese Walls" to restrict the access of most
administrative departments to confidential information. See generally Harman, Chinese Wall, in
TWELFTH ANN. INST. ON SEC. REG. 703-14 (1980) (summarizes "Chinese Wall" techniques). The
courts have divided on the sufficiency of the Chinese Wall defense in insider trading cases. Com-
pare Slade v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 517 F.2d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 1974) (rejected Chinese Wall
defense) with O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 292, 297
(N.D. Ill. 1977) (approved Chinese Wall defense).
148. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 comment (Final Draft 1983)
(lawyer having access to client information acquires duty of confidentiality); see also New York
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fiduciary obligations thus extend vertically to all its attorneys. 150
Less clear, however, is the question whether the firm's obligations
extend to its nonlawyer employees. 151 This category includes parale-
gals, clerks, and secretaries.' 52 Under traditional agency principles, an
employee becomes a fiduciary of the employer with respect to informa-
tion received in the course of employment. 53 For example, when a
legal secretary legitimately receives inside information, he owes a duty
to his employer to protect its confidentiality. 54  Footnote fourteen,
however, requires a fiduciary relationship with the firm's client.' 55 The
secretary is not a fiduciary of the firm's client for two reasons. First, the
secretary has no contractual or apparent authority 5 6 to affect the cli-
ent's rights or responsibilities. 157 Second, the employee's contractual re-
lationship with his employer does not constitute actual or constructive
consent to serve as the client's fiduciary.'58 Power'59 and mutual assent
are essential attributes of agency relationships. 60 Bootstrapping the
City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 225 (1932) (attorney
who overhears another's client cannot exploit information thus acquired); MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 5.1 & 5.2 (Final Draft 1983) (lawyers bound by ethical rules even
though not directly responsible to client); THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT Preface
(Rev. Draft 1982) (obligation of confidentiality extends beyond lawyer-client relationship).
150. But see N.Y.LJ., Sept. 19, 1983, at 22, col. I ("not at all clear" that lawyer not assigned to
the case acquires fiduciary duty to the client).
151. The Canons of Professional Ethics extended the duty of confidentiality to nonlawyer em-
ployees. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 37 (superseded 1970). Similarly, a few juris-
dictions extend the attorney-client privilege to nonlawyer employees. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:158A-12 (West 1971) (attorney-client privilege extends to Public Defender's employees);
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 4503(a) (Consol. 1963) (mandatory attorney-client privilege extends to
attorney's employees).
152. See Nat'l L.J., Sept. 19, 1983, at 22, col. 1 (questioning applicability of footnote fourteen
to these persons).
153. See Brophy v. Cities Servs. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 244, 70 A.2d 5, 7 (1949) (employee in
possession of confidential information concerning client becomes fiduciary of employer). See
supra text accompanying note 103.
154. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
155. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3261 n.14 (1983).
156. "Apparent authority" refers to the "power to affect the legal relations of another person
by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accord-
ance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 8 (1958).
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18 & comment b (1959) (fiduciary cannot
delegate power requiring use of discretion).
158. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
159. "Power' refers to "an ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a given legal
relation by doing or not doing a given act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 6 (1958).
160. See supra notes 86 & 102 and accompanying text.
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secretary's duties to encompass those of the firm conflicts with the prin-
ciple that a secretary's obligations extend only to his employer.
Traditional agency principles 16' prohibit the employee from exploit-
ing confidential information acquired in the course of employment.162
It would be anomalous indeed to permit the legal secretary to use such
information while subjecting the firm's attorneys to liability under rule
lOb-5.163 Imputing the firm's obligations to the secretary, without con-
fusing the distinct spheres of the employer-employee and firm-client
relationships, requires some middle step.
C Misappropriation and the Middle Step
The misappropriation theory"6 advanced in United States v. New-
man 65 provides the middle step. The issue of misappropriation arises
when an outsider, after legitimately receiving information in the course
of his employment, converts that information to his own use.166 Under
this theory a secretary acquires the firm's fiduciary duties if he misuses
confidential information. 67 In this context, the secretary's misappro-
priation violates his fiduciary duties to the firm. 68
The Second Circuit defined the boundaries of this type of misappro-
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1959) (agent prohibited from using con-
fidential information for his own benefit).
162. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrTriON § 200 (1937).
163. Typically, non-lawyer employees are fully aware of the prohibition against misuse of
client information. See infra Appendix. For example, many firms require new employees to agree
in writing to protect the confidentiality of information obtained in the course of employment. See,
ag., Nat'l Li., Jan. 23, 1954, at 26, cols. 1-2 (Wachtell, Lipton's safeguards against insider trad-
ing); cf. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549, 559 (D. Conn. 1964) (employee contract
designed to protect trade secrets). In such circumstances, the codification of the attorney's ethical
duties to the firm's clients does not justify distinctions between the ethical responsibilities of a
lawyer and a legal secretary. See Insider Trading by Law Firm Employees, SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 13437 (Apr. 8, 1977) (securities antifraud laws apply to nonlawyer em-
ployees). But cf. Comment, The DuIfui Relationshkps of Section 10(b): The Chiarella Decisions, 42
U. PrTr. L. REv. 637, 649-50 (1981) (rule l0b-5 does not cover employee's misuse of information
obtained from employer).
164. See infra notes 165-85 and accompanying text.
165. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). See infra text accompanying notes 169-74.
166. For instance, Vincent Chiarella's activities constituted such a conversion. Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 244-45 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 245-46 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). A second type of misappropriation occurs when an outsider illegally obtains inside
information, such as through the theft of corporate documents. Legal Times, July 11, 1983 at 28,
00l. 1.
167. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. But see Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d
121, 125 (2d Cir. 1934) (employee not fiduciary toward employer).
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priation in United States v. Newman.1 69 In Newman the government
alleged that two employees of investment banking firms disclosed con-
fidential information about impending takeovers to Newman.170 New-
man then passed the information to two confederates.1 71 Based on this
information, the three conspirators purchased shares in the target com-
panies.172 The court held that Newman would be criminally liable if
he had aided and abetted the misappropriating tippers,17 3 for the in-
vestment bankers had acquired the information in their capacity as fi-
duciaries of the target companies.
1 74
Dirks' focus on the relationship of the parties 1 5 does not foreclose
acceptance of the Newman theory.' 76 Dirks simply requires a fiduciary
breach against the issuer as an element of outsider liability. Newman
supplies a means of acquiring this fiduciary responsibility. Imposing
the fiduciary duties of an employer upon a misappropriating employee
is fully consistent with Dirks.'77 For example, if a legal secretary re-
169. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
170. Id at 15.
171. Id
172. Id
173. Id at 16. In Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1240 (1984), the Second Circuit limited Newman's holding to criminal prosecutions. Id at 15-
16. The court noted that an employee of a corporate fiduciary owes no duty of disclosure to the
general public. Id at 15.
174. Id at 17-18. In Chiarella the Commission argued that the defendant breached a fiduciary
duty to his employer by trading on confidential corporate information. See Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 243 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Newman, however, does not suggest
approval of such a theory, for Chiarella held that a duty to disclose arises from a special relation-
ship with the issuer'r shareholders. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text. In Chiarella
the printer was a fiduciary of the aggressors in impending takeover bids.
175. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
176. Footnote fourteen independently justifies the result reached in Newman. Newman's in-
formants, investment bankers, were insiders of the issuer. Under this approach, Newman would
be criminally liable as a tippee. See generally Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16
REv. SEC. REG. (S & P) 841, 846 (1983) (footnote fourteen's impact on Newman remains unclear);
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 18, 1983, at 2, cols. 3-4 (same).
177. Dirks offers some support for the Newman misappropriation theory. See N.Y.L.J., Aug.
18, 1983, at 2, cols. 3-4 (Dirks does not undermine Newman). The Court pointed out that Dirks
did not "misappropriate or illegally obtain the information about Equity Funding." Dirks v.
SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3267 (1983). Moreover, Chief Justice Burger, the proponent of the misap-
propriation theory in Chiarella, joined the Court's opinion in Dirks. A number of commentators,
however, contend that the Newman misappropriation theory is inconsistent with Dirks. See, e.g.,
Phillips, Insider Trading Liability After Dirks, 16 REv. SEC. REG. (S & P) 841, 845-46 (1983)
(Dirks'rationale "squarely contradicts" misappropriation theory); 15 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 37, 1773 (Sept. 23, 1983) (Dirks "lend[s] no support" for misappropriation theory); N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 6, 1983, at 2, col. I ("very little in Dirks to support" Newman theory); Legal Times, July 11,
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ceives corporate information in the course of employment and exploits
that information, he should inherit the firm's ethical obligations to the
issuer. The Newman theory provides the means for imposing the firm's
fiduciary duties on those employees who knowingly exploit inside in-
formation.178 The employee, by violating his fiduciary duty to the em-
ployer, should acquire a duty to abstain from trading in the client's
securities.
179
Without the functional application of Newman, Chiarella and Dirks
dictate an absurd result. For example, if an attorney with a special
relationship to an issuer 8' "tips" his secretary for an improper pur-
pose' 8 ' and the secretary trades, the latter is clearly liable under
Chiarella as a "participant after the fact. ' 2 If, however, the attorney
discloses the information for a legitimate purpose, such as through rou-
tine dictation, the secretary would avoid liability for trading unless the
Newman theory applied.'83 The secretary's conduct is the same in both
situations. If he acquires a derivative duty in the first situation,'84 he
should also inherit a duty in the second.1
85
1983, at 15, col. 1 ("Dirks decision tends to vitiate . . . misappropriation theory"). These criti-
cisms correctly assert that Newman is no longer viable to the extent that it rests on a duty to
persons other than the issuer. Nevertheless, Dirks does not forclose a union of the Newman and
"constructive insider" theories to impose a fiduciary responsibility on a misappropriating em-
ployee toward the issuer's shareholders.
178. Many commentators criticize the misappropriation theory as an improper intrusion into a
state law matter. See, e.g., Wang, Post-Chiarella Developments in Rule Job-5 15 REv. SEC. REG.
(S & P) 956, 961 (1982) (misuse of information covered by state law); Comment, The Dutiful
Relationships of Section 10(b): The Chiarella Decisions, 42 U. PITr. L. REv. 637, 649-50 (1981)
(theft of information adequately covered by state law). These criticisms, however, do not apply to
the author's functional use of Newman. The critics premise their argument on the adequacy of
state law. If the misappropriating employee acquires a duty to his employer's client, however, he
becomes a "constructive insider" under footnote fourteen. See supra notes 164-74 and accompa-
nying text. If he trades, he violates lOb-5. The presence of state blue sky laws does not supplant
the federal sanction.
179. The SEC does not follow this approach. The Commission views the "misappropriation"
and "constructive insider" concepts as completely separate. Telephone interview with Phillip
Parker, Associate Director, SEC Enforcement Division (Feb. 8, 1984).
180. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
182. See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980).
183. Dirks states that a tippee is liable only if the tipper breached a fiduciary duty in making
the disclosure. Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3264 (1983). Seesupranotes 76-79 and accompany-
ing text.
184. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
185. Cf Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 3271 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (Dirks' "im-
proper purpose" requirement anomalous because it does not affect shareholders' injury).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Chiarella-Dirks emphasis on fiduciary duty undoubtedly leaves
unregulated some unfair trading practices.' 86 Footnote fourteen pro-
vides a workable device to impose a fiduciary obligation on those out-
siders who occupy a special position within the securities markets. A
balanced reading of the footnote, however, suggests its limitations. It
covers only those persons with preexisting duties to the issuer's share-
holders and, derivatively, those persons who misappropriate inside in-
formation from corporate fiduciaries.
Robert E Bacharach
186. For example, aggressors in takeover fights typically obtain corporate information that is
inaccessible to members of the general public. Eg., 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZA-
TIONS, CORPORATE AcQuisITIO NS AND MERGERS § 27.05 [4] (1981). See supra note 57 and ac-
companying text. Similarly, journalists investigating corporate wrongdoing regularly obtain
confidential information. Neither the aggressor nor the journalist is a fiduciary of the issuer. See
supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a fiduciary relationship).
As a result, they are not constructive insiders and can trade on secret information. See generally





LAW FIRM POLICY STATEMENTS CONCERNING INSIDER TRADING
1. Anonymous
Staff members are to observe strict rules of confidentiality with re-
gard to any and all information received in the capacity of employ-
ment. This requires that information concerning clients of the firm
must not be discussed with anyone within or outside of the office.
Written materials should not be taken outside the office except when
authorized.
A breach of confidentiality could result in termination.
2. Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts (St. Louis, Mo.)
As previously noted, the policy of this Firm is that all client mat-
ters are confidential. Many matters which we handle for our clients
are of such a nature that any disclosure of, or reference to, such
problems outside the Firm could have a major adverse impact not
only upon our clients but also upon the Firm and its relationship
with our clients.
In this regard, you are reminded that many of our clients have
publicly traded securities and that the Firm routinely receives infor-
mation which has not been released to the public and which could be
of great significance in the securities trading market. The antifraud
provisions of the Federal securities laws, as well as our ethical stan-
dards, mandate that the confidentiality of nonpublic information be
preserved and, in particular, that such information not be used as the
basis for trading in securities. This obligation extends not only to the
lawyers of the Firm, but also to all legal assistants, secretaries and
administrative personnel. The Securities and Exchange Commission
vigorously enforces this policy, as evidenced by the attached article
which appeared in the Federal Securities & Corporate Developments
section of the Securities Regulation & Law Report in October 1983.
You are reminded that such information should not only be held
in confidence by you, but, in addition, that you are not permitted to
use any information either for personal gain or to assist others to
achieve a personal gain.
Any violation of the foregoing policy against trading securities on
the basis of confidential information could result in civil or criminal
proceedings brought against you by the Securities and Exchange
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Commission and other agencies and will result in your dismissal
from the Firm.
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